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In February the chair of Fideuram, Intesa Sanpaolo’s private-banking arm, received a WhatsApp message that appeared to come from Intesa’s chief executive, Reuters reported on September 26. A phone call followed from what sounded like a senior partner at a law firm. “AI technology was used to replicate the lawyer’s voice, making the call appear genuine,” Reuters wrote.
Transfers of about €95 million, or $108 million, followed, mainly to accounts in China and Hong Kong. About €53 million has been recovered. About €36 million was converted to crypto and remains untraced. Milan prosecutors are investigating, and Intesa and Fideuram declined to comment.
The scheme worked at the top of a large, well-controlled institution. It relied on authority and urgency, and on a voice the target had reason to trust.
- Require call-back verification on a known number for any executive-initiated wire, with no exception for senior staff.
- Train executives and wire-room staff on cloned-voice requests that arrive through messaging apps.
This is for information only and is not legal advice. Verify the details against the linked reporting before acting.